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OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRISCO JOE'S, INC., a Utah
corporation, DONALD VAUGHN
TOLMAN and JOANNA TOLMAN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v

Case No,
14,515

ELLIS Y. PEAY, GORDON HALL
and KENNETH HOSTETTER,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT PEAY

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for forcible entry and unlawful
conversion by the lessee against the lessor of a commercial
lot and building.

The lessor also counterclaimed for de-

linquent rent payments owing under the lease agreement.
The lessee also alleged that Defendants Hall and Hostetter,
who had entered the business premises following the removal
of the original lessee therefrom, had also converted the
said lessee's equipment and furnishings left in the building.
Defendants Hall and Hostetter counter-claimed for damages
for interference with their use of said personal property;
said defendants further cross-claimed for indemnification
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for damages, for damages for the deprivation of the full
use of said personal property, and to quiet title to the
said personal property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court on December 22,
1975f the Honorable J. Robert Bullock/ presiding*

The Court

dismissed all claims with prejudice, except that it entered
judgment for $1/250.00 for the defendant Peay against the
plaintiff Tolman for unpaid rent and made no decision concerning the ownership of the personal property in question.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Peay seeks affirmance of the judgment
of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Respondent Peay controverts the facts as set
forth in the appellant's brief/ as follows:
1.

The lease agreement between the appellant and

Respondent Peay provided for a term of five years commencing
January 1/ 1975 until December 31/ 1979/ with the aggregate
rental totaling $26/400.00/ payable in monthly installments
of $400.00 for 1975 and $450.00 thereafter.

All payments

were payable in advance and due on the first day of the month/
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with the exception of the payment for the last month's rent
which was due on March 15/ 19 75.

Said lease agreement also

provided that any unpaid rent or charges were to constitute
a first lien against any personal property on the premises
and such property was not to be removed until all rent and
charges were paid. (Plaintifffs Exhibit 11/ paragraphs 1/
2 and 15)
2.

The trade fixtures and equipment purchased

by the appellant from Jay Hamilton were subject to a promissory note and security agreement with Restaurant Stores
and Equipment/ which note and security agreement had been
assigned to Walker Bank.

As of March 15/ 1975 the payments

were substantially in arrears and foreclosure was imminent.
(R 37/ 174)
3.

Despite repeated demands by Peay that the rent

be paid/ the appellant was delinquent for the February and
March rental payments thus compelling Peay to demand that
all rent be paid by March 5/ 19 75.

CR 103)

On March 5f

1975 the appellant came to the respondent's home and indicated
that he was bankrupt; that he could not pay rent for February
or March nor the $450.00 payment due on March 15/ 1975; that
he was working at J. C. Penneys; that his sister who had
been managing and operating the business during the daytime
had quit; and that he would have to give the building up.
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Respondent Peay then requested that Tolman surrender the
keys to the building so Peay could enter and place a "For
Rent sign" on the premises and Tolman agreed but wanted to
keep the keys for a few days so he could remove some personal
property.

Several days passed without the keys being de-

livered whereupon Peay attempted to contact Tolman but was
unsuccessful in doing so.
livered.

The keys were in fact never de-

(R 169, 181, 182)
4.

On March 11, 1975 Respondent Peay received

a telephone call informing him that the door to the premises
was unlocked and open and -upon inspection such was found
to be true.

He also noticed that some items of personal

property were missing from the building and therefore assumed
that Tolman had removed everything that he desired.
188).

(R 171,

Since he had been unable to contact Tolman, Peay then

had the locks changed the following morning in order to secure
the premises and the contents.

(R 170).

On March 12, 1975,

the day the locks were changed, Tolman discovered the same,
but made no demand upon Peay then or at anytime thereafter
that the premises or its contents be restored to him.

(R

106, 107, 117).
5.

Subsequent to March 12, 1975 Peay learned of

the note and security agreement to Restaurant Stores and
Equipment and that unless payments thereupon were immediately
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forthcoming the equipment and trade fixtures would be repossessed.

(R 174).

On or before April 1, 1975 negotiations

were commenced concerning the leasing of the building to
Respondents Hall and Hostetter.

Since Tolman had apparently

abandoned the equipment and trade fixtures and was obviously
in no position to bring the payments current it was decided
that someone would have to purchase the equipment from Restaurant Stores.

It was initially decided that Peay would

purchase the equipment from Restaurant Stores and would then
be reimbursed therefor by Hall and Hostetter.
189).

(R 175, 188/

A lease agreement was then drawn up wherein reimburse-

ment was provided for.

(Plaintiff Exhibit 12). However

after further consideration Peay decided that he did not
want to get involved with the purchase of the equipment and
the lease agreement was never executed, although Hall and
Hostetter did enter into possession of the premises shortly
thereafter. (R 175).

Hall and Hostetter thereafter made

arrangements with Walker Bank and Restaurant Stores to assume
the promissory note and security agreement on the equipment.
(Defendant's Exhibit 18).
6.

On April 14, 1975 Respondent Peay first learned

that Tolman still claimed an interest in the equipment and
trade fixtures when he was served with a ten-day summons.
At Peay's instance a letter dated April 25, 1975 was sent
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to Appellant Tolman offering to return any of the appellant's
personal property upon the submission of a list of said
property still on the premises*
No list was ever submitted.
7.

CDefendant's Exhibit 19).

(R 190).

No communications were made by Tolman to Peay

after March 5, 1975 until April 14, 1975 when Respondent
Peay received the summons relating to this action. (R 117).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT RESPONDENT
PEAY WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY UNDER SECTION 78-36-1
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
Forcible entry and detainer statutes have been
enacted in nearly every state for the purpose of preventing
the breaches of the peace which had frequently occured under
the common law when a landlord exercised his right to forcefully dispossess a tenant who was delinquent in his rent
payments.

Section 7 8-36-1, Utah Code Annotated was enacted

for the same general purpose: "The Forcible Entry and Detainer
Statute was enacted for the primary purpose of preventing
disturbances of the peace brought about through self-help
in the matter of dispossession. King v Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419,
285 P 2d 1114 (1955).

Hence when a delinquent tenant refuses
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to surrender the premises upon demand, the landlord must
institute an action for wrongful detainer in lieu of his
common law remedy of self-help.

However, because the gravamen

of an action for forcible entry is an unlawful interference
with the possession of a tenant the statute is inapplicable
in those situations where the tenant is not in actual possession , whether by abandonment or surrender.

Consequently

to maintain an action for forcible entry a plaintiff must
establish that he was in actual and peaceable possession
of the premises and that the defendant forcibly entered and
dispossessed the plaintiff by force.

Section 78-36-9, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953.
The appellant fails to take cognizance of the
requirement that the tenant be in actual possessionf inasmuch
as in all the cases relied upon in the appellant1s brief,
no question was raised regarding the tenant's possession,
rather the controversy there centered around whether the
lessor's actions constituted a forcible entry or whether
such actions were excused by a provision in the contract
granting the right to enter.

In particular, the Peterson

case, which the appellant maintains is "almost exactly
identical" to this case, is distinguishable on its facts.
There, unlike this case, "no demand was made at that time
that the rental be brought up to date, and no indication
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was made of an intention to terminate the lease."
Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 331; 400 P 2d 507 (1965)

Peterson v

Moreover the

appellant's citation from the Mariani case merely indicates
what the burden of proof is at the trial level, as to whether
a surrender by operation of law will be found.

As pointed

out below, upon appeal the appellate court has a duty to uphold
the findings of fact by the trial court if such are supported
by substantial evidence.
In this case the trial court found that the appellant
surrendered his possession of the premises to the respondent
on or about March 12, 197 5.

"The question of whether the acts

and circumstances constituted a surrender and acceptance is
one for the fact finder."

Mariani Air Products v Gill's Tire

Market, 29 Utah 2d 291, 292, 508 P 2d 808 (1973)

Hence in

the absence of an express agreement surrendering the premises
the trial court must ascertain the intent of the parties as
manifested by their acts in order to determine whether there
has been a surrender by operation of law.

Belanger v Rice,

2 Utah 2d 250, 252; 272 P 2d 173 (1954)
At the trial substantial evidence was introduced
indicating that the appellant intended to and did surrender
the leased premises to the respondent.

Respondent Peay

testified that on March 5, 1975 the appellant met with him
as his home and said,
. . . that he had gone as far as he could go, that
he was going to have to take out bankruptcy, that

Page 9
he hadnft been able to make his February payment
and that he could not make his March paymentf nor
he couldn't make the last month's payment that
he agreed to make on the 15th day of March? making
a total of $1,250.00; and that he would have to
give up the building because he had already gone
to work for J. C. Penneys, and his sister didn't
want to continue in the business any longer, and
so he would have to give it up and give it back
to me.
(R 169)

On cross examination Respon'dant Peay reaffirmed

that appellant Tolman had manifested his bankruptcy and intent
to surrender the building. (R 181, 182)
Respondent Peay further testified and the appellant
admitted that Tolman had agreed to return the keys to the
respondent after he had had a couple of days to remove some
personal property from the premises.

(R 169 and 115).

The appellant's intent to surrender the premises
on March 5, 1975 becomes clear when viewed in the context
of the surrounding circumstances.

The appellant testified

that he had barely covered his expenses the first month of
operation and for the second he had failed to make enough
even to cover the rent.

Moreover he testified that he had

worked 12 hours a day six days a week for which he drew no
salary whatsoever.

(R 116)

Evidence was also introduced

that the appellant had placed a "Closed For Remodeling" sign
on the building on or before March 5, 1975, but no remodeling
was ever carried out and the real reason for closing the
business was lack of sufficient funds to keep the business
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open.

(R 116}

Furthermore it was testified that prior to

March 5, 1975 the appellant had begun removing some of the
equipment and personal property from the business premises.
(R 117-119)

The appellant also testified that subsequent

to March 5, 1975 he never contacted the respondent nor at
anytime demanded that the premises be returned.

(R 117)

If the appellant1s intent was not to surrender the premises
it would seem that the appellant would have at least maintained some contact with the respondant subsequent to March
5, 1975 and he would certainly have protested the changing
of the locks on March 12, 1975.
The evidence also clearly indicates that the respondent
accepted the appellant's surrender of the premises on or
before March 12, 1975.

The Respondent Peay testified that

upon hearing of Mr. Tolmanfs intention to give up the building,
he had remarked,

"Well, if thats the case, we had better

put a for rent sign on it and get it rented . . ." —

thus

indicating his understanding that unless a surrender was
effected the appellant would still be on the lease.

(R 169)

Mr. Peay further reaffirmed his acceptance of the surrender
upon cross examination where he denied any intention on his
part, to assist the appellant in leasing the building to
someone else.

(R 182)

As indicated above there is substantial evidence
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from which the trial court was justified in drawing the
conclusion that a surrender had been made.

By virtue of

the greater proximity of the trial judge to the parties
involved and the surrounding circumstances, great deference
is traditionally accorded findings of fact on appeal. The
Utah Supreme Court recognized this in Charlton v Hackett,
11 Utah 2d 389, 390; 360 P 2d 176 (1961) where it stated,
In considering the attack on the findings and
judgment of the trial court it is our duty to follow
these cardinal rules of review: to indulge them
a presumption of validity and correctness; to
require the appellant to sustain the burden of
showing error; to review the record in the light
most favorable to them; and not to disturb them
if they find substantial support in the evidence.
Since there was substantial evidence of a surrender of the
possession of the premises the trial court's finding that
there was no forcible entry should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT RESPONDENT
PEAY DID NOT UNLAWFULLY CONVERT THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF
THE APPELLANT.
In Allred v Hinckley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 76; 328 P 2d
726 (1958) this court defined the act of conversion:

"A

conversion is an act of wilful interference with a chattel,
done without lawful justification by which the person entitled
thereto is deprived of its use and possession."

Hence
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in order to maintain an action for conversion a plaintiff
must prove 1) that he had an immediate right to possession
of the chattel and 2) that the defendant unlawfully deprived
him of the possession thereof.

It is the immediate right

to possession, not the ownership of the chattel, which is
of concern.

Johnson v Flowers, 119 Utah 425, 428; 228 P

2d 408 (1951) Where the property is subject to a lien in
favor of a defendant and is withheld because of the lien,
it is necessary to tender the amount due the lienholder before
bringing an action for conversion.

18 Am Jur 2d.

In this

case the appellant expressly covenanted that any unpaid rent
or charges were to constitute a first lien on the fixtures,
furnishings, machinery, equipment and other items of personal
property and that such personal property was not to be removed
from the premises until the said rent and charges were fully
paid.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, paragraph No. 15). The appellant

admitted that he was in arrears for two month's rent and
could not pay the last month's rent as agreed to in the
contract, and also that he never at any time after March
5, 1975 tendered the rent that was in arrears. Hence under
the terms of the lease agreement the respondent was entitled
to a first lien right which was superior to any right to
possession claimed by the appellant and therefore due to
the lack of the right to immediate possession, an action
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for conversion cannot be maintained.
In addition to failing to establish an immediate
right to possession, the appellant also did not establish
that there was an unlawful assumption of ownership or control
by the respondent over the chattels involved*

Where the

original taking was lawful, where the defendant is rightfully
in possession, or where there has been no wrongful assumption
of ownership it has been held that a demand upon the defendant
is necessary in order to establish an unlawful assertion
of ownership and control.

18 Am Jur 2d 19 7.

The Utah Supreme

Court imposed an even more stringent standard in Christensen
v Pugh, 84 Utah 440, 26 P 2d 100, 104 (1934) where it observed,
It is undoubtedly true that there are cases
where a demand is unnecessary, but we know
of no case, and we can think of no situation,
where a demand for possession is not a
requisite to an action for conversion, except
where facts are pleaded which show it impossible
for the bailee to deliver or such a demand
would be useless.
As pointed out above the appellant had surrendered the
premises to the respondent and therefore any initial assumption of control over the chattels was certainly within
the bounds of the law.

Moreover since the respondent held

a first lien right he was entitled to possession of the
personal property within the building, until the rental
payments were brought current.

Hence because the intial

taking was lawful a demand for the return of the property
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must have been made in order to maintain an action for
conversion*

Since it was admitted that no demand was

ever made (R 117) there was not the requisite wrongful
assumption of ownership of control at the time when the
respondent secured the premises or at any time thereafter.
The appellant contends that Respondent Peay
appropriated the equipment and furnishings for his own use
when he leased the building to Respondents Hall and Hostetter.
However the evidence shows that Peay never at any time
claimed to own the equipment, although because of Hallfs
and Hostetter's financial condition, Peay agreed to pay off
Restaurant Stores and Equipment to prevent repossession and
then have Hall and Hostetter reimburse Peay over a period
of time. A lease agreement providing for the reimbursement
was prepared, but after further consideration Peay decided
that he did not want to get involved and consequently the
lease agreement was never executed.

Hall and Hostetter then

independently negotiated with Restaurant Stores and Equipment
for the assumption of the note and security agreement.
175, 176, 189)

(R

Furthermore the evidence also shows that once

the Respondent Peay learned

that Tolman still claimed an

interest in the equipment and trade furnishings he was at all
times willing to deliver any personal property still on the
premises to Tolman upon the submission of a list of the items
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of personal property still claimed by the appellant.
fendant's Exhibit 19)

(De-

Such list was never submitted by

Mr. Tolman.
In summary the respondent contends that since the
appellant surrendered the premises and also had no immediate
right to the possession of the equipment and trade fixtures
within the building by virtue of the respondent's first-lien
rights, there was no conversion of the property when the
respondent secured the premises by changing the locks.
Moreover there was no subsequent conversion of the appellant's
alleged personal property because the appellant abandoned
such personal property by making no demand for the return
thereof and by allowing the payments on the note to become
delinquent to the point that foreclosure was imminent. Furthermore, once the respondent learned that the appellant still
claimed any interest in the equipment he was at all times
thereafter willing to deliver to the appellant any property
owned by him.

The trial court was therefore correct in

dismissing the action for wrongful conversion.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED THE RESPONDENT
$1,250.00 FOR DELINQUENT RENT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE LEASE
AGREEMENT
According to the lease agreement between the appellant
and respondent, the term of the lease was for a period of
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five (5) years commencing January 1, 1975 to December 31,
1979.

The aggregate rental for such period was $26,400.00,

payable in one month installments, each payment for the
following month being due on the first day of the month.
The payments were to be $400.00 per month for the first year
and $450.00 per month for each month thereafter.

In addition

the lessee agreed to pay the "last months rent" amounting
to $450.00 and payable on or before March 15, 1975. Moreover
the appellant also agreed that in the event of a lawful
re-entry or surrender, he would be liable for the difference
between the rent reserved for the portion of the term remaining
after re-entry or surrender and the amount received from
a party reletting for such portion of the term.
In the trial the appellant admitted being in arrears
for the months of February and March.

(R 117)

There is

no contention that the rent for February was not correctly
awarded? however the appellant does contend that an award
for rent accruing in March should be made only on a pro rata
basis.

Such a position however is untenable.

f|

If the rent

for the entire period between rent days is payable in advance
a surrender during the period does not operate to discharge
the rent or any portion thereof for such period.

The theory

of this view is that rent payable in advance is considered
as accruing on the date on which it is due."

Hindin v Caine,

104 CA 2d 238, 231 P 2d 83 (1951); 18 ALR 967; 49 Am Jur
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2d 1067.

Since the March rental payment was due on March

1, the appellant was correctly held liable for the full amount
of the March rental payment.
The appellant also contends that the award for
the "last month's rent" was duplicative or in any event had
not accrued until March 15, 19 75.

That the award was not

duplicative is clearly established by the lease agreement
which provided that the term of the lease was to commence
on January 1, 1975 and continue until December 31, 1979,
and that the lessee was to make an advance payment of $450.00
"which shall constitute the last month's rent under the terms
of the lease."

Clearly the month in contemplation was December

of 1979, and not the last month of occupation in the event
that the lease was prematurely terminated.
Regarding the appellant's contention that the "last
months rent" had not accrued at the time of the surrender
it is important to keep in mind that the lease agreement
provided for a tenancy for years. As such a lessee becomes
liable, to the extent not mitigated by rental payments made
by another lessee subsequently entering the premises, for
the entire sum of rental payments agreed to, (in this case
$26,400.00) notwithstanding the fact that the payments may
be made in monthly installments.

In fact in this case the

appellant explicitly agreed that in the event of re-entry

Page 18
or surrender, he would be liable for such difference. (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 11, Clause 14)

Hence in any event the appellant

is liable for rent for the period of time when the premises
are vacant, which in this case was March 12 to April 1.
Normally payment for such "last month's rent" is demanded
at the date of execution of the lease agreement, but in this
case due to the appellant's inadequate financial resources
he was granted an additional period of time to make the payment.
Since the last month's payment had accrued prior to the surrender,
the trial court was correct in making an award of $1,250.00.
CONCLUSION
There was substantial evidence from which the trial
court could find that the appellant surrendered the premises
in question to the respondent.

Since the appellant had sur-

rendered the premises he did not have the requisite possession
necessary for the maintenance of an action for forcible entry.
Further, since the appellant had surrendered the
premises and since the respondent held a first lien on the
appellant's personal property, the appellant was not entitled
to immediate possession of his alleged personal property
within the leased building.

Moreover since the initial

assumption of control was lawful, and no demand was ever
made thereafter and the respondent was always willing to
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relinquish any personal property owned by the appellant,
there was no subsequent conversion of the appellant's personal
property.

In view of the foregoing the trial court was

correct in holding that there was no wrongful conversion
by Respondent Peay of the appellant's personal property.
Furthermore all rights to rent payments accrued
at the signing of the lease and since the appellant defaulted
in the payment thereof, he was correctly held liable in the
amount of $1,250.00.
The respondent therefore respectfully requests
that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
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